Chapter
Twelve
Ringgold
Gap
“Taking, as we always did, the
post of honor, our division was ordered to retard the advance of the Federals,
until our discomfited army could be rallied”, wrote Daniel Govan. Along with
this duty, the division had to burn any supplies that could not be taken with
the army. Although the men on this detail carried off as much food as they
could, the vast majority of it was soon blazing high into the night sky along
with the wagons. (1)
While marching south, a staff
officer from Hardee rode up and informed the general that he was to abandon the
rear guard to fend off an expectant attack at Graysville. Cleburne looked at the staff officer
skeptically and began to question him sharply about the particulars of his
order. He eventually admitted that he had not slept in two days and that he
could have misunderstood the order. Deciding to ignore these supposed orders, Cleburne commenced the
march.
Nearly twelve hours after
repulsing the first assault, the division arrived at Chickamauga Creek;
unfortunately, they found that the bridge had already been burned. A man from
Bragg’s headquarters, waiting for the rear guard’s arrival, informed Cleburne that Bragg wanted
him to take his division through the icy cold waters that night. Furthermore, Cleburne
was to resume the march by 4am towards Ringgold Gap. Cleburne was not in the mood. He knew that if
he carried out Bragg’s orders, many of his men would freeze to death on the
opposite bank, as they had no tents. Instead, Cleburne ignored these orders and ordered his
men to bivouac, despite the danger of being cut off on the wrong side of the
creek by a pursuing enemy.
At midnight, November 27, a
courier from Bragg aroused Cleburne
from sleep. His new orders were to fortify his division at Ringgold Gap,
holding it at all costs until he was notified that the wagons were safe.
Understanding that this could well mean the destruction of his entire command, Cleburne ordered the
courier to ride to headquarters to put his orders in writing. After some time,
the courier returned with the orders:
The general desires that you will take
strong position in the gorge of the mountain and attempt to check pursuit of
enemy. He must be punished until our trains and the rear of our troops get well
advanced. The reports from the rear are meager and the general is not
thoroughly advised of the state of things there. Will you be good enough to
report fully?
After scribbling a hasty reply, Cleburne,
his escort, and Buck crossed the cold waters of the Chickamauga to get a general survey the area
of defense. Thousands of sleeping soldiers covered the road to Ringgold.
Crossing the Western & Atlantic Railroad outside of town, they followed its
route towards the gap. Rising high above it was White Oak Ridge to its left and
Taylor Ridge to its right. A thousand feet
between these ridges, the gap was only wide enough for the railroad, a wagon
trail and a small stream to pass through its length of four thousand feet. The
south ridge, Taylor’s,
was about 400 feet high so stationing men there would be difficult. The north
ridge, White Oak, rose more gradually in its ascent and was flanked towards the
town by a heavy fringe of timbers in which to conceal troops. Another plus was
the open field of fire in its front. (2)
Returning to camp around 2:30am, Cleburne sent Buck to find
headquarters for further instructions. After ridding for about three miles,
Buck arrived at Catoosa Station. Being ushered into a dimly lit freight room,
Buck announced himself and what division he was from. Bragg, in an
uncharacteristically animated style, grabbed Buck by the hand and pleaded,
“Tell General Cleburne to hold his position at all hazards, and keep back the
enemy, until the artillery and transportation of the army is secure, the
salvation of which depends upon him”. (3)
Meanwhile, Cleburne had aroused the weary division and
ordered them across the river. A private in Polk’s Brigade recalled, “The
weather was cold and air frosty…The water cold, and in places to our waists,
but thoughtful Old Pat had big fires on the south sides and we warmed some but
dried little”. As they stood around the crackling fires, preparing to march,
one private muttered to another, “Something is going to happen”. “Why?” asked
another. The private motioned towards the general as he mounted his horse.
“Look at General Cleburne, don’t you see war in his eyes?” (4)
Arriving ahead of his troops, Cleburne took the
opportunity to survey the area more carefully. But his examination was brief; already,
he could see Hooker’s advancing army through his field glasses by the light of
the full moon. Wasting no time, he placed the first brigade to arrive, Govan’s,
in what was perhaps the most crucial point on the field: the gap itself.
Regardless of what Hooker did on his right or left flanks, if the center broke,
the rest of the division could be rolled up. Missionary
Ridge had taught that lesson all too well. Concealing the Irish
regiment, the 5th/13th Arkansas across the gap’s entrance with a
screen of brush, Govan’s other three regiments were placed behind it for
support along with two of Semple’s batteries.
Granbury’s Texas Brigade was
placed along the base of White Oak Ridge where Cleburne expected most of the fighting to
occur. Here, they were concealed among the timbers and protected by a natural
barricade of shale boulders. As an extra precaution, Cleburne
placed the 7th Texas
on top of the ridge as lookout against the flank being turned along with Polk’s
Brigade, which would act as reserve. On Taylor’s
Ridge, he placed one of Govan’s regiments and three companies from the 6th/7th
Arkansas.
As they would be outnumbered,
one division against five, Cleburne
knew that their only chance at victory was the element of surprise. Therefore,
ordering his men to hold their fire until he gave the signal, Cleburne sent the 9th Kentucky
Cavalry to skirmish with Hooker’s troops as they crossed the creek, falling
back as they advanced into the gap. Cleburne wrote:
I had scarcely half an hour to make these dispositions, when I was informed
the enemy's skirmishers were crossing the Chickamauga,
driving our cavalry before them. Immediately after the cavalry retreated
through the gap at a trot, and the valley in front was clear of our troops, but
close in rear of the ridge our immense train was still in full view, struggling
through the fords of the creek and the deeply cut up roads leading to Dalton,
and my division, silent, but cool and ready, was the only barrier between it
and the flushed and eager advance of the pursuing Federal army.
Hooker, eager to pounce upon what he thought was an
unsuspecting rear guard, pushed his troops boldly towards the gap without
waiting for artillery support. The first line, 3,375 Iowans and Missourians led
by Brigadier General Osterhaus marched towards White Oak Ridge and the gap
itself with “the utmost decision and celerity”. (5)
Watching their movements through his field
glasses near Lieutenant Goldthwaite’s two Napoleons stationed in the gap, Cleburne held the signal
until they were within range. To one soldier, “seconds seemed like hours. We
felt they would be on us before Cleburne
ever gave the signal”. Finally, almost leaping into the air, Cleburne cried “Now, Lieutenant! Give it to
‘em now! The gunners, pulling aside the brush, opened
fire at close range with shell and canister, ripping a hole in the Federals’
center, scattering them “like chaff before the wind”. Granbury’s men, needing no other signal,
opened on the enemy in their front with a concentrated fire. Five more
discharges of grapeshot in quick secession were more than the bewildered
Federals in front of the gap could withstand. As they ran back to the creek for
cover, a private from the 6th/7th Arkansas jumped up from
his concealment exclaiming, “By Jove, boys, it killed them all!” Cleburne, smiling,
replied, “If you don’t get down, young man, you are liable to find that there
are enough left for you to get the top of your head shot off”. (6)
Although the Federal right had broken,
their left was holding strong against Granbury. Cleburne wrote:
Farther to his left, however, he continued to advance, and made a heavy
attack on [White Oak Ridge]. He continued to advance in the face of a deadly
fire from Major Taylor's regiment, with the determination to turn the right
flank of the Texas
brigade. Major Taylor deployed skirmishers up the hill at right angles to his
line of battle, and held him in check, while he informed Colonel Granbury of
the state of affairs. Colonel Granbury sent two companies of his left regiment
to re-enforce his right. With three companies of his own regiment Major Taylor
charged down the hill upon the force attempting to turn him, and routed it,
capturing between 60 and 100 prisoners and the colors of the Twenty-ninth
Missouri Regiment.
Seeing that
Hooker’s troops were marching still further to the right of White Oak Ridge, Cleburne ordered Polk to
move his brigade from reserve up to the top of the ridge to keep Granbury from being
flanked. Polk’s Brigade and the 7th Texas, pouring volleys of fire down into their
ranks, pushed the enemy back down the hill. (7)
While watching this fight, Cleburne
large numbers Hooker’s troops crossing the Chickamauga, heading towards White Oak
Ridge. He ordered the “Fighting
Preacher”, Lowrey, to rapidly take his brigade to the endangered right to
assist Polk. Polk’s men were struggling to hold back the Federals, who were 20
yards away and firing as they advanced up the ridge. Pushing his three
regiments up the ridge, Lowrey arrived just in time and checked the enemies’
advance. Lowrey recalled:
The victory was ours
and the enemy was gone down the hill in perfect confusion. A deafening shout of
triumph went down our line, and General Polk, as if enwrapped in the glory of
our success dashed up to me, and seizing me by the hand exclaimed “Just in time
to save us, General!” The men, observing the rapture of their brigade
commanders, again pierced the heavens with their shouts of triumph, greatly to
the annoyance, no doubt, of the discomfited columns of the enemy. This was the
most glorious triumph I ever witnessed on a battle field.
The
quick repulse of the enemy gave Polk and Lowrey time to arrange their regiments
for another attack, which they could see was forming at the base of the ridge.
Placing their men in double lines at the top of the ridge, the generals placed
the 2nd Tennessee
in a position to flank the enemy as they advanced. At the base of the ridge was
a depression or hollow. When the Federals rose out of this hollow during their
advance, they were immediately met with fire on their flank from the 2nd
Tennessee.
Despite heavy losses, their strong lines charged up the ridge, crashing into
the double lines of Polk and Lowrey at the top. In the brutal hand-to-hand
engagement that followed, the Confederates pushed the Federals back down the
ridge with bayonet and rifle butt. Hurling stones after them, Polk’s and
Lowrey’s men chased them to the bottom, where they again face fire from the 2nd
Tennessee. (8)
An hour after the fight had begun, the
remnants of Osterhaus’s shattered division limped back to Hooker’s
headquarters. “Fighting Joe” was not happy. Instead of accepting defeat on the
Confederate right he sent forward the lead brigade of the arriving Geary’s
Division. Commanded by Colonel W.R. Creighton, the brigade of Ohio
and Pennsylvania
troops passed by Osterhaus’s routed men and marched in a confident, almost
conceited manner towards White Oak Ridge. When warned by Osterhaus’s men to
advance more carefully, Creighton’s men replied that “Eastern soldiers would
soon show these Westerners how to fight”. (9)
The routine was nothing new to Polk and
Lowery. Perceiving that this brigade was marching to the right of their
position, they simply shifted their forces. Crawling up the rocky face, the
brigade was met by frontal and flank fire. Soon they went crashing down the
mountain like ninepins and back to a now furious Hooker. Turning to their
division commander, who had had nothing to do with Creighton’s attack, Hooker
yelled, “Have you any regiments that will not run?” Geary simply replied, “I
have no regiments that will run.” Hooker, pointing towards the smoke-filled gap
said, “Then send some men into that gap and hold it until my artillery
arrives”. (10)
Cleburne wrote:
But I must now
return to the extreme left, which the enemy attempted to turn. He sent what
appeared to be a brigade of three regiments to the creek upon my left, and
crossed over some companies of skirmishers. These were promptly met and stopped
by a detachment from the Sixteenth Alabama, posted on the left-hand hill, and
the main body was for some time held in check by Dulin's skirmishers, on the
face of the left-hand hill, and the other skirmishers of Govan's brigade, on
the creek bank and in the patch of woods to the left of the railroad. He got
possession, however, of some houses and barns opposite this point, from which
he annoyed me with a constant and well-directed fire of sharpshooters.
The
Whitworth squad soon joined in the fight. Seeing there was no place to hind,
the enemy brigade made a desperate charge into the gap and attacked Govan’s
Brigade. “Lieutenant Goldthwaite” Cleburne
wrote, “quickly trained round his guns and swept them at quarter range with a
load of canister and a solid shot” compelling them to retreat. (11)
About noon, Cleburne received word that the trains were
safe and that he could withdraw. Rebuilding the screens, the artillerists
removed their pieces quietly by hand to the rear. Cleburne, to create the impression that they
were not retreating, left some skirmishers in line as the rest of the men left
their positions. By the time the skirmishers withdrew at 2pm, Hooker was
pounding the sides of White Oak and Taylor’s
Ridge with his long-awaited artillery. As his men burned the bridge separating
them from the enemy, Cleburne,
mounted, called out, “I am proud of what you boys have done to-day, and I don’t
think they will bother us any more this evening”. (12)
Although questioned by the
just-arrived General Liddell as to whether he should have pulled his men from
their defensive positions so quickly, Cleburne
and those present at the battle knew that the decision was not only right but
also timely. Hooker’s artillery barrage was just a precursor to his next move:
a reinforced attack that would inevitably overwhelm them on their flanks. “To
know when to retreat and to dare to do it”, as Cleburne’s
military model, Wellington
said. (13)
Sam Watkins recalled:
Cleburne had the doggondest
fight of the war. The ground was piled with dead Yankees; they were piled in
heaps. The scene looked unlike any battlefield I ever saw. From the foot to the
top of the hill was covered with their slain, all lying on their faces. It had
the appearance of the roof of a house shingled with dead Yankees. They were
flushed with victory and success, and had determined to push forward and
capture the whole of the Rebel army, and set up their triumphant standard at Atlanta—then exit Southern
Confederacy. But their dead were so piled in their path at Ringgold Gap that
they could not pass them. The Spartans gained a name at Thermopylae,
in which Leonidas and the whole Spartan army where slain while defending the
pass. Cleburne’s
Division gained a name at Ringgold Gap, in which they not only slew the
victorious army, but captured five thousand prisoners besides. That brilliant
victory of Cleburne’s made him not only the best general of the army of
Tennessee, and covered his men with glory and honor of heroes, but checked the
advance of Grant’s whole army.
The
“decent whipping” that the division had given the enemy at Missionary
Ridge and Ringgold Gap forged the brigades of Polk, Govan, Lowrey,
and Granbury into an elite fighting force. “Four better officers are not in the
service of the Confederacy”, wrote Cleburne.
Cleburne
himself was subsequently heralded as the “Stonewall of the West”. (14)
Sherman estimated his casualties
at Missionary Ridge as being relatively low.
In reality, they amounted to 1,300 men, including prisoners, prompting Hooker
to declare that his attack “can only be considered in the light of a disaster.”
Hooker himself defended his own decision to attack the rear guard without
artillery support; he spoke frequently of the “Confederate disaster” at
Ringgold Gap, claiming that Cleburne’s
losses were at least “three to our one”. Cleburne’s
actual losses were 20 killed, 190 wounded, 11 missing. Despite his denials,
Grant was not happy and Hooker was subsequently removed from his position for
incompetence and given a desk job in Chicago.
A resolution of thanks from the Confederate Congress was approved on February
9, 1864.
Resolved, That the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby
tendered, to Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, and the officers and men under his
command, for the victory obtained by them over superior forces of the enemy at
Ringgold Gap, in the State of Georgia, on the 27th day of November, 1863, by
which the advance of the enemy was impeded, our wagon train and most of our
artillery saved, and a large number of the enemy killed and wounded. Resolved,
That the President be requested to communicate the foregoing resolution to
Major-General Cleburne and his command.
In reply to a
letter from Miss Rowe Webster of Tennessee,
thanking him for his “deeds of gallantry” At Ringgold Gap, Cleburne wrote:
To my noble division and not to myself belong the praises for the deeds
of gallantry you mention. Whatever we have done, however, has been more than
repaid by the generous appreciation of our countrymen. I assure you that I feel
the same ardent longing to again recover the magnificent forests and green
valleys of Middle Tennessee that you do, and live in hope that God will restore
it to our arms. I cannot predict when that time will be, and yet I feel that it
is certainly in the future. We may have to make greater sacrifices—to use all
the means that God has given us—but when once our people, or the greater part
of them, sincerely value independence above every other earthly consideration,
then I will regard our success as an accomplished fact. (15)
Sources
1: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 10 page 150
2: Cleburne’s report of the Chattanooga-Ringgold
Campaign: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
3: A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 6, page 119
4: A Meteor Shining Brightly: page 121
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 9 page 171
:
Ibid
:
Ibid
5: O.R. Series I Vol.
XXXI part 2
: Stonewall of the
West: chapter 9 page 173
6:
Stonewall of the West: chapter 9 page 173
: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 10 page 154
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 9 page 173
: Ibid
7: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
8: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 10 page 155
9: This Band of Heroes: chapter 7 page 94
10: A Meteor Shining Brightly: chapter 6 page 134
: Ibid
: Ibid
11: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
: Ibid
12: Stonewall of the
West: chapter 9 page 175
13:
A Meteor Shining Brightly: chapter 6 page 137
14: Co. Aytch:
chapter 10 page 108-109
: Stonewall of the
West: chapter 9 page 176
: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
15: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 10 page 159
: Ibid: page 157
: http://www.swcivilwar.com/CleburneMissionaryRidgeReport.html
: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 12 page 171